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ARE THESE BUBBLES ANARCHIST?  
PETER SLOTERDIJK’S SPHEROLOGY AND THE QUESTION 
OF ANARCHISM 	
IWONA JANICKA 
 
 
Abstract 
The question of solidarity is an important one for anarchism. However, so far 
solidarity as a concept has not been given the philosophical attention it deserves. In 
this paper I wish to fill in this gap in the anarchist literature and discuss solidarity 
from the perspective of Peter Sloterdijk’s work. I will examine the key features of 
Sloterdijk’s theory of spheres and claim that his spherology can be useful for thinking 
about solidarity in the context of anarchism. Sloterdijk’s work also allows for a 
theoretical support of the anarchist idea of slow, everyday transformation that is often 
contrasted with its main counter model for social change – revolution. It also offers an 
alternative to the usual philosophical reference that anarchists turn to in order to 
describe anarchist collectives, that is, Gilles Deleuze’s rhizomes. Although not an 
anarchist himself, Sloterdijk provides a theoretical framework to understand and 
constructively think about anarchism and contemporary anarchist movements.  
 
Key words: solidarity, anarchism, Peter Sloterdijk, spheres, social transformation, 
mimesis 
 
 
In her contribution to The Continuum Companion to Anarchism entitled ‘Where to 
Now? Future Directions for Anarchist Research’ Ruth Kinna pointed out a gap in 
anarchist literature concerning the question of solidarity (Kinna 2012: 316). Little has 
been written about anarchism with a key focus on solidarity and virtually nothing can 
be found on a philosophical concept of solidarity in relation to anarchism. In this 
paper I will attempt to fill in this gap in anarchist literature and discuss solidarity from 
the perspective of Peter Sloterdijk’s work. His Spheres project (1998–2004) and his 
You must change your life (2009) are the key foci of this paper.1 I will examine 
selected features of Sloterdijk’s theory of spheres that are relevant to anarchism. Here 
I will work with Uri Gordon’s definition of contemporary anarchism in practice that 
he elaborates in Anarchy Alive! (2007). My claim is that Sloterdijk’s spherology can 
be useful for thinking about solidarity in the context of anarchism, and in particular 
for eco-anarchist movements. Sloterdijk’s work also allows for a theoretical support 
of the anarchist idea of slow, everyday transformation that is often contrasted with the 
model of social change achieved through the means of a revolution. As his description 
of society is based on the concept of mimesis and training – defined as a bodily 
repetition of available models – Sloterdijk’s ideas can be useful for thinking about 																																																								
1 I use the published English translations wherever available, that is, Spheres I, 
Spheres II and You must change your life. For Spheres III, the translations from 
German are my own. I use the following abbreviations: S I – Spheres I, S II – Spheres 
II, S III – Spheres III, MLA – You must change your life.  
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anarchist collectivities. These collectivities try to introduce alternative, daily practices 
into their micro social structures as a way to permanently change the surrounding 
world. I will show that this is where Sloterdijk’s mimetic concept of training can be 
used as a valuable conceptual tool towards understanding anarchist collectives. My 
claim throughout this paper is that contemporary anarchism in practice is an effective 
form of harnessing mimesis towards a more habitable world. What is more, 
Sloterdijk’s theory of spheres offers an alternative structure to the usual philosophical 
model that anarchists use in order to describe anarchist collectives, that is, Gilles 
Deleuze’s rhizomes (see Gordon 2008). Although rhizomes are a powerful image, 
they emphasize the network links between entities rather than the spaces in which 
these entities are embedded. I wish to argue that spaces, which anarchists create 
through their practices and which they inhabit, are crucial for understanding 
contemporary anarchism in practice. Sloterdijk’s structure has a form of bubbles and 
foams and is based on the concept of immunity that we share not only with other 
human beings but also with the environment, the plants, the animals, architectural 
structures, meta-narratives, technology. I wish to demonstrate that although Sloterdijk 
himself is not an anarchist,2 he provides a valuable theoretical framework to 
understand and think about contemporary anarchist movements.  
Before we begin, it is relevant to briefly describe Sloterdijk’s position both in 
the Anglophone academic world and in Germany. Peter Sloterdijk, besides Jürgen 
Habermas, is the most important contemporary German philosopher, yet he remains 
less well known among the Anglophone academic audience. This is partly because 
only few of his books have been translated into English so far. Among the works that 
I am going to discuss here, only the first two volumes of his trilogy Spheres are 
available in English and the translation of Du mußt dein Leben ändern (2009) (You 
must change your life) was published in 2013. In Germany, Sloterdijk does not 
receive the deserved scholarly attention even though he is the most widely read 
philosopher by the German general public. On the one hand, this might be due to the 
fact that he blurs the distinctions between philosophy and literature in his style of 
writing and his style of thinking. This makes it particularly challenging for academic 
scholars to engage with him on a strictly philosophical level. On the other hand, the 
scholarly silence around Sloterdijk among his German colleagues might be due to the 
infamous ‘Sloterdijk-Habermas’ scandal at the end of the 1990s. Since then the 
philosophical sides have been picked, scholarly war zones established and for the time 
being it seems that Habermas holds the upper hand in the German academia. 
Sloterdijk however strongly appeals to the general public that is interested in 
philosophy. This is clear considering that he is the most commercially successful 
contemporary philosopher in Germany since the war and his Critique of Cynical 
Reason from 1983 is the bestseller among philosophical books in Europe. In the 
German academia he is however a highly problematic and undeservedly neglected 
figure that, in my view, is valuable for thinking about contemporary anarchism in 
practice. Below I will focus on two aspects relevant to anarchism: the question of 
solidarity and the everyday, ‘slow’ social transformation in anarchist collectivities.3 
 
 
 																																																								
2 In fact Sloterdijk has a very restricted understanding of anarchism in that he equates 
it with violence and revolution; see, for instance, MLA 49–50, 154, 385–97.  
3 I develop these ideas in greater detail in my forthcoming book (Janicka). 
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COEXISTENCE IN MICROSPHERES: DYADIC SUBJECTS  
 
The tacit assumption of this paper is that in order to think properly about anarchism 
on the philosophical level, one needs to rethink the concept of collectivity and, 
together with it, collective social transformation. In order to do that, in turn, one needs 
to completely rethink conceptual points of departure. Instead of thinking about human 
beings as individuals who try to make connections with the outer world – a standard 
assumption in the Western philosophical tradition, one needs to start thinking about 
humans in terms of pluralities that run the constant risk of becoming separated. 
Sloterdijk does that because he conceptualizes the human being as originally a dyadic 
structure always nestled in a sphere. That is why, as it will become clear, Peter 
Sloterdijk’s work can be valuable to anarchist rethinking of collectivity and social 
change. The sphere is a key notion with which he attempts to describe both human 
beings and human space in a new way, combining topological, anthropological, 
immunological, and semiological aspects. This is to emphasize the rarely considered 
idea of the ‘interior’, which is created between two human beings and the space 
around them in an intimate ‘being-with’, which Sloterdijk calls a microsphere or a 
bubble (see S III 13). He characterizes it as sensitive, adaptive and moral 
(seelenräumlich) immune system. For Sloterdijk, humans cannot exist without an 
immune system, which means they cannot exist beyond ‘the wall-less hothouses of 
their closeness relationships’ (S II 135). They create various worlds together with 
other people, animals or things, which are called spheres. A sphere is ‘a place of 
strong relationships’ where one establishes a ‘psychical relation of reciprocal lodging’ 
(S III 302) with people and objects nearby. In his grand meta-narrative that is 
Spheres, Sloterdijk presents human beings from the point of view of intimacy and 
relocation and is interested in forms of collectivity and, most importantly, in ‘the 
collective forms of individuality’ (see Schinkel and Noordegraaf-Eelens 2011: 7). In 
what follows I briefly outline how Sloterdijk conceptualizes a system in which 
humans originate from plurality and are inextricably connected to the inorganic world 
surrounding them. This is crucial for understanding solidarity from Sloterdijk’s 
perspective and connecting it to eco-anarchist movements.  
In order to understand how Sloterdijk thinks about spheres it is useful to 
consider the first sphere a human inhabits. In Spheres I Sloterdijk considers the 
smallest possible form of sociality. His point of departure is one anterior to the 
habitual Freudian conceptualization of a human being. Sloterdijk focuses on the time 
before the birth: the nine months after conception, where a human being begins to 
exist only in and through a relationship with another human being – the mother. His 
initial assumption is that human being starts as a coexistence, rather than a 
metaphysical autonomous one. ‘Being-a-pair’, he claims, ‘precedes all encounters 
[…] it always takes precedence over the two single units of which it seems to be “put 
together”’ (Sloterdijk and Funcke 2005). Human space is from the beginning bipolar, 
and it is co-subjectivity that is a basis for subjectivity. Therefore, being is always 
primarily being-with and ‘there can be no I without us’ (Thrift 2012: 140). It is 
therefore only through being in a pair and in the act of habitation that a subject comes 
into existence and continues existing. From this perspective, individualism and 
loneliness come chronologically after being-with: ‘With this we enter the terrain of a 
radicalized philosophical psychology that departs from the general faith in the priority 
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of individuality’ (see Sloterdijk and Funcke 2005) and this philosophical gesture 
accomplishes a radical critique of subjectivity. 
For Sloterdijk, humans are first and foremost ‘human locators’ in that they are 
‘subjects only to the extent that they are partners in a divided and assigned 
subjectivity’ constituted by space (S I 85). Existence starts with inhabiting a mother’s 
body and proceeds to inhabit closed interiors, apartments, and houses. This transfer 
from space to space is accompanied by recreating protective envelopes, which 
constitute immunity, using technological means. For Sloterdijk humans have no 
choice but to build spheres. They need protective or immunizing systems to survive. 
In order to exist they need to be ‘continually working on their accommodation in 
imaginary, sonorous, semiotic, ritual and technical shells’ (S I 84). They are, in that 
sense, interior designers. Sloterdijk defines a sphere as 
 
[t]he interior, disclosed, shared realm inhabited by humans – in so far as they 
succeed in becoming humans. Because living always means building spheres, 
both on a small and a large scale, humans are the beings that establish globes 
and look out into horizons. Living in spheres means creating the dimension in 
which humans can be contained. Spheres are immune-systemically effective 
space creations for ecstatic beings that are operated upon by the outside. (S I 
28)  
 
The name Sloterdijk gives to humans is Homo immunologicus, which describes 
humans as creatures that ‘exist not only in “material conditions”, but also in symbolic 
immune systems and ritual shells’, as those who must give their lives a symbolic 
framework (MLA 10). Humans are embedded within envelopes that give them 
meaning and recreate a form of physical or psychic protection. These envelopes are 
formed through strong relations with people or with other entities that give us 
immunity, ranging from architectural structures, interior spaces, and technology to 
grand meta-narratives such as religious and political systems. Such envelopes are 
always spatially situated, and often take form of the physical spaces that surround us. 
One can say that a microsphere emerges whenever a psychical or physical membrane 
is established that provides immunity (see Borch 2011: 32). Because humans need 
multiple spheres and multiple immune mechanisms to exist, the world in Sloterdijk’s 
philosophical system is not a single coherent whole but rather it is made up of 
immiscible worlds. Humans participate and create multiple microspheres 
simultaneously. As Bruno Latour rightly observes: ‘we move from envelopes to 
envelopes, from folds to folds, never from one private sphere to the Great Outside’ 
(Latour 2011: 158–9). Latour compares the relationship of the human to the 
inaccessible Great Outside with a cosmonaut in the outer space who cannot survive 
without his life support system and so ‘naked humans are as rare as naked 
cosmonauts’ (Latour 2011: 158). In order to survive one needs to create immunity and 
therefore ‘we are never outside without having recreated another more artificial, more 
fragile, more engineered envelope’ (see Latour 2011: 158). Depending on a type of 
immunizing technique that is needed at a given time, humans are constantly moving 
between different existing microspheres or creating insulating bubbles of their own. 
Because Sloterdijk is concerned with ‘collective immunological forms’ he is 
deeply interested in dwelling and housing in all possible senses (Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf-Eelens 2011: 20). That is why ‘an inquiry into our location’ is so 
important. Humans are ek-static beings, a thought that Sloterdijk explicitly borrows 
from Heidegger; however they ‘must first be homely, must first be housed, before 
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[they] can become ecstatic’ (Sloterdijk 2001: 199, cited in Morin 2012: 84). ‘The 
home, the dwelling place, is therefore essential to the coming-to-the-world of the 
human animal’ (Morin 2012: 84). Spheres are exactly those worlds that are 
‘membranes that protect against outside but [that] are not airtight and impervious like 
environmental enclosures’ (Morin 2012: 84). As Sloterdijk says in an interview:  
 
I claim that people are ecstatic, as Heidegger says, but not because they are 
contained in nothingness, but rather in the souls of others, or in the field of the 
soul of others, and vice versa. They themselves are ecstatic because the other 
always already penetrates them. (Sloterdijk, Noordegraaf-Eelens and Schinkel 
2011: 185–6) 
 
The Heidegger inspired being-in-the-world means, for Sloterdijk, ‘being-in-spheres’ 
and spheres are the product of human coexistence. Humans can almost in all 
situations create an ‘endosphere’ with another human being. This endosphere between 
people constitutes, for Sloterdijk, human interiority. This interiority is conceptualized 
as external to an individual – a concept radically different to the one in depth 
psychology where interiority is inside the individual: ‘[a human] is a natal 
[geburtliche] and mortal creature that has an interior because it changes its interior’ (S 
II 198). Sloterdijk has an expanded vision of such interiority – he discusses the 
apartment in the times of modernity in terms of human interiority. In Sloterdijk’s 
view, the apartment for the contemporary human is an immune system (see S III 535). 
It is a means of defence (Verteidigungsmaßnahme) and an expansion of a body 
(Körperausdehnung). Therefore, it is not possible to feel at home without first 
becoming almost unconsciously one with all the objects that fill one’s apartment (see 
S III 521). These constitute in a way a part of our interiority. A symbiosis with the 
apartment, becoming one with one’s immediate environment, is an insulation 
technique, a form of protective cocoon: ‘where uninvited guests practically never 
have access’ (see S III 582, 540). Interiority viewed from this perspective is neither 
internal nor entirely human. It is made up of links with inanimate objects and the 
environment in which humans are placed. As Efrain (2012: 153–4) succinctly puts it 
while discussing Sloterdijk’s sphere: 
 
The fundamental microcosm is […] that which takes place when at least two 
bodies interact in a relation of co-existence which is both spatial and 
psychological, and which includes the objects, machines in our negotiations 
with physical and cultural environments from which we seek protection or 
immunization.  
 
  
From this perspective, space is crucial because it is the medium of contact with 
others. Working on one’s different spheres in life, being the designer of one’s own 
life spaces, and co-creating them with others, is one of the key activities in the 
creation of microspheres. It is important to remember that humans are not only 
designers of their own interior but also, together with other humans, of the world. 
This aspect of collectivity in designing public and private spheres is essential also for 
anarchism. Both anarchism and theory of spheres are anchored in the necessity of 
sharing spaces with others – with the outer limit of a single planet – and with the 
responsibility related to this fact.  
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SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNINTELLIGIBLE 
 
The concept of solidarity is an important one for anarchism. Anarchism is based on 
the idea of support of entities in the position of vulnerability, the unrecognised, those 
who are unintelligible from the perspective of the current ‘distribution of the sensible’ 
(partage) (see Rancière 2004). This means that anarchism focuses not only on persons 
or groups that are exploited, controlled, coerced, and discriminated against but also, 
and, I would claim most importantly, it focuses on entities not recognized as ones 
whose suffering counts. Uri Gordon in his book Anarchy Alive! hints at this feature of 
anarchism when he defines contemporary anarchist movements: 
 
The anarchist movement as we see it today in advanced capitalist countries is 
not a direct genealogical descendant of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century thread of libertarian-socialist militancy, which was effectively wiped 
out by the end of the Second World War. (Gordon 2009: 261) 
 
Instead, the roots of today’s anarchist networks can be found in the process of 
intersection and fusion among radical social movements since the 1960s, 
whose paths had never been overtly anarchist. These include the radical, 
direct-action end of ecological, anti-nuclear and anti-war movements, and of 
movements for women’s, black, indigenous, LGTB and animal liberation. 
Accelerating networking and cross-fertilisation among these movements led to 
a convergence of political cultures and ideas alongside and (to be honest) way 
ahead of the conventional Left (whether social-democrat, liberal or Marxist). 
The conditions for a full-blown anarchist revival reached critical mass around 
the turn of the Millennium. (Gordon 2008: 5) 
 
He continues: 
 
While often drawing directly on the anarchist tradition for inspiration and 
ideas, the re-emergent anarchist movement is also in many ways different 
from the left-libertarian politics of hundred, and even sixty, years ago. 
Networks of collectives and affinity groups replace unions and federations as 
the organisational norm. The movement’s agendas are broader: ecology, 
feminism and animal liberation are as prominent as anti-militarism and 
workers’ struggles. […] A stronger emphasis is given to prefigurative direct 
action and cultural experimentation […]. These qualitative changes add up to 
something of a paradigm shift in anarchism, which is today thoroughly 
heterodox and grounded in action. (Gordon 2008: 5–6)  
 
To this focus on action and heterodoxy, Gordon also adds as its constitutive concepts 
the open-endedness of the movement’s goals and its diversity. In order to describe 
anarchist organization, he invokes Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome: a ‘decentralised 
global network of communication, coordination and mutual support among countless 
autonomous nodes of social struggle, overwhelmingly lacking formal membership or 
fixed boundaries’ (Gordon 2008: 14). This structure, as we will see, bears similarity 
to Sloterdijk’s foam because of the non-linearity, multiplicity, diversity and plurality 
of connection between different anarchist collectivities. Moreover, the lack of 
	 7 
hierarchy between anarchist collectivities makes foam an appropriate structure for 
describing anarchism. Before we turn to anarchist collectivities as foam, let us 
consider the concept of solidarity from Sloterdijk’s perspective and relate it to 
anarchism. 
My claim is that with the Sloterdijkian understanding of solidarity it is 
possible to suggest an alternative definition of anarchism to what Uri Gordon 
proposes in his Anarchy Alive! As Gordon is not able to propose a single term that 
would capture the diversity of anarchism, he analyzes it using a cluster of concepts. 
He takes political culture and resistance to domination as his two key concepts. He 
supplements them with additional satellite terms such as prefigurative politics (direct 
action), diversity, and open-ended goals (see Gordon 2008: 29). By gathering together 
overlapping interests of different activist movements and their similar modes of 
operation, he creates a kind of family resemblance among anarchist initiatives. In that 
way he is able to account for the wide variety of anarchism. I claim that with 
Sloterdijk and his conceptualization of solidarity we are able to come up with a single 
umbrella term that could describe contemporary anarchist movements.4 I wish to 
demonstrate that Sloterdijk’s nobject relation5 can be in fact considered as a relation 
to unintelligibility and that this is where one can connect it to the contemporary 
anarchism in practice as Gordon describes it. As quoted above, ‘the radical, direct-
action end of ecological, anti-nuclear and anti-war movements, and of movements for 
women’s, black, indigenous, LGTB and animal liberation’ (Gordon 2008: 5) are, in 
my view, all connected by solidarity with the entities in the position of vulnerability. 
Solidarity with (localized) unintelligibility is a key concept that unites the efforts of 
these different activist groups, be it environmental issues, the abuse of animals or 
discrimination towards the transgender or Palestinian struggles. It is solidarity with 
unintelligibility, also beyond the question of the human, that is at the centre of 
anarchist concerns. Solidarity in anarchist practice is immediately opened up towards 
anything that is in need of solidarity: animals, the environment or humans.	From the 
perspective of Sloterdijk’s framework it is possible to make an ontological (and 
perhaps even a normative) claim that one’s primary solidarity is with the 
unintelligible. By rethinking the concept of solidarity it is also possible to give 
stronger support to the eco-anarchist aims and aspirations from the philosophical 
perspective. 	
In his description of nobject relation, Sloterdijk starts with the moment of 
conception rather than birth. The foetus and its partner (the placenta) are united by a 
bipolar intimacy, the first solidarity. The primary pair ‘floats in an atmospheric 
biunity, mutual referentiality and intertwined freedom from which neither of the 
primal partners can be removed without cancelling the total relationship’ (S I 43). 
Nobject relation is a relation, which is first perceptible for an individual if it is denied 
or terminated. As long as the foetus is living inside the mother, it floats in a non-
duality and does not realize it is part of somebody else, that is, that it is in a relation 
with a mother. Its nature is a closeness relationship, which is erased as a relationship 
because there is no subject–object relation but rather an un-relationship (see S I 287–																																																								
4 Admittedly, Gordon mentions ‘a culture of solidarity’ (see Gordon 2008: 76–7, 16–
17). However it occupies a marginal place in Gordon’s account and when it appears it 
is considered only as a relation between humans. Although solidarity hovers in his 
account, it is not considered central for understanding contemporary anarchism in 
practice and it also has a more restricted meaning to the one I attempt to propose here.  
5 Nobject is a term that Sloterdijk borrows from Thomas Macho’s work (S I 467).	
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9). This is one of the points of critique that Sloterdijk makes towards psychoanalysis 
when he claims that it is a mistake to describe the early mother–child relationship in 
terms of object relationships (see S I 293). To be precise, Sloterdijk does not negate 
the existence of an object–subject relationship but rather he claims that what makes us 
into a subject is a part that is undistinguishable from us. It is a no-part, something 
without which we are incomplete or have problems in existing: that which, to use 
Judith Butler’s term, ‘undoes us’ if it is taken away. Solidarity, ‘a creaky word from 
the nineteenth century’, is often used to describe this connecting force between 
people, groups and nations even though it does not fully account for this strong reason 
for being together (see S I 45).  
From spherological perspective, solidarity is the primary relation between a 
human being and the surrounding world. The unintelligible entity is connected with us 
through solidarity. Sloterdijk proposes air as an example of a nobject relation. Once 
the child is born, the newborn’s first partner is the outside world – before it comes in 
contact once again with the mother – it is the air that it breathes, which replaces the 
lost amniotic fluid as the successive element: ‘For the child, extra-maternal being-in-
the-world first and last of all means being-in-the-air and participating without 
struggles […] in the wealth of this medium’ (S I 298). The idea that a human being 
arrives at birth into the ‘wealth of air’ resonates repeatedly in Spheres. As a medium, 
air cannot be described in object terms, and therefore, together with atmosphere, it is 
in a nobject relation to humans. However once air is denied to a human, it moves into 
an object relation with the human (see S I 298). Nobject is then ‘the unabandonable 
intimate something, without whose presence and resonance the subject cannot be 
complete’. This something can be ‘things, media or people that fulfil the function of 
an intimate augmenter for subjects’ (S I 467). Nobject, like an unintelligible entity, is 
an entity that cannot be captured by the available partage of the available categories 
in the world. However, without it, a given entity cannot exist.  
In this respect, air, and what he calls air conditioning, is of particular interest 
and importance to Sloterdijk. This is because we are in a nobject relation with this key 
medium after birth. With growing air pollution, our connection to air is being 
transformed from a nobject relation into an object–subject relation, with dangerous 
consequences for ourselves. From spherological perspective, the unity of humankind 
(Einheit des Menschengeschlechts) cannot be diagnosed any longer through a 
common physis (nature) but rather through a common location (Lage) that has to be 
considered ecologically and immunologically – including the medium of air (see S II 
947–8). In this way, climate techniques (Klimatechnik) and breath techniques 
(Atmotechnik) are key in thinking about contemporary collectivities: ‘Society is its 
room temperature, it is the quality of its atmosphere; it is its depression, it is its 
clearing up; and it is its fragmentation into countless local microclimates’ (S II 966). 
From spherological perspective questions of humanity and the Umwelt, as both the 
natural environment and the social world around us, become thoroughly political (see 
S II 967). As one can see, the theory of spheres, where solidarity is based on common 
space and on the fragility of that space is, as Sloterdijk calls it, a ‘postheroic theory’ – 
a theory in which the emphasis is transferred from the eternal, substantial and primary 
of the heroic theory towards the ‘fleeting, unimportant, secondary’ of spherology (see 
III 37). It is a theory that sides with the unintelligible entities and exposes our 
constitutive solidarity with them. It is a theory far removed from a revolutionary, 
heroic model.  
We can see here that Sloterdijk proposes a non-anthropocentric 
conceptualization of solidarity. By proposing an alternative story to the one told by 
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psychoanalysis, Sloterdijk is able to advance a radical idea of solidarity with the 
outside. This concept of solidarity is conceptualized not only to include human-to-
human relations but also the world surrounding the human. It puts forward the idea of 
a human, not as a lonely and separate being, but rather as one that is right from the 
start and inextricably connected to the world around her: to the air she breathes, to the 
spaces she inhabits, to the technologies that immunize her. It is solidarity with entities 
that one does not recognise but without which one is not able to exist. Through 
proposing solidarity as our intimate connection to unintelligibility, Sloterdijk offers an 
interesting theoretical approach towards the environment. He is able to account 
convincingly for our reasons for solidarity with the natural world. He provides both a 
new idiom and a philosophical grounding that are directly in line with green-
anarchists’ interests. His spherology shifts the philosophical focus from humans to 
non-humans actors, to air, to nature. From Sloterdijk’s perspective, solidarity is the 
primary relation between a human being and the surrounding world. Whereas it seems 
awkward to use for instance the concept of domination to account for environmental 
concerns,6 such as air or water pollution, with Sloterdijk’s idea of nobject it is 
possible. That is why, in order to account for and philosophically support eco-
activism in anarchist movements, Peter Sloterdijk’s work is particularly helpful.  
If we consider the concept of solidarity from the perspective of classical 
anarchism, it seems that solidarity with the intelligibility bears much resemblance to 
Peter Kropotkin’s idea of mutual aid. Both ideas focus on practices of solidarity, on 
developing good habits that, for Kropotkin, ‘insure maintenance and further 
development of the species’ or of a specific group (Kropotkin 1939: 24). However, 
solidarity with the unintelligible that I wish to propose here is a much more radical 
idea than Kropotkin’s mutual aid. Mutual aid that Kropotkin discusses in his work is a 
phenomenon internal to a species (in case of animals) and internal to a concrete 
human grouping (a tribe, a guild, a city in medieval times). Kropotkin describes it as 
an instinctive tendency towards co-operation between animals: bees, ants, termites, 
crabs or foxes; and between humans in specific organisations. He considers the so-
called savages, barbarians, mediaeval city and the 19th century society. These cases of 
mutual aid are based on relations of inclusion and exclusion from a group. That is 
why solidarity in Mutual Aid seems to be considered on too small a scale. In contrast 
to Kropotkin’s idea, solidarity with the unintelligible is an inter-species and inter-
organic phenomenon. It takes a planetary dimension. It is a relation of a human to the 
entirety of the world that immediately surrounds her. It is her unacknowledged 
relationship (what Sloterdijk calls un-relationship) to air, water, other humans, 
animals and plants. In that way solidarity with the unintelligible is a much broader 
concept than Kropotkin’s mutual aid. It encompasses a whole spectrum of entities 
beyond our affinity to the members of the same group or the same species.  
The concept of solidarity with the unintelligible encompasses all anarchists’ 
concerns: both the unintelligible entities in form of the transgender, Palestinians, 
homosexuals and the unintelligible in form of the natural world. Instead of 
domination, it seems that solidarity with such entities could be a term that is able to 
account for all the diverse contemporary social movements that Gordon brings 
together under the umbrella term: contemporary anarchism in practice. The richness 
of the world we arrive into: the wealth of air, the multiplicity of connections we are 
able to make with the animate and inanimate worlds, is what predisposes us towards 																																																								
6 The importance of the concept of domination for anarchism is argued for most 
convincingly by Todd May (2009) and Uri Gordon (2008). 
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connections of solidarity with the world around us, cooperation and community. It 
pushes us towards responsibility, co-habitation and trust. Solidarity with the 
unintelligible is a point of departure for humans arriving into the world. In that way 
Sloterdijk provides ontological reasons for solidarity that are valuable for thinking 
about contemporary anarchism in practice.  
 
 
ANARCHIST COLLECTIVITIES AS TRAINING CAMPS 
 
Gordon’s contemporary anarchism shares with spherology the idea of non-
revolutionary forms of social change.7 The anarchist idea is to enact a society that one 
wishes to live in rather than to wait for a revolution to happen: ‘The strategic outlook 
already prevalent among anarchists is that the road to revolution involves the 
proliferation of urban and rural projects of sustainable living, community-building 
and the development of skills and infrastructures’ (Gordon 2008: 107). Gordon rightly 
observes in his argument against revolution: ‘The moment one focuses merely on the 
seizure of state power, and maintains authoritarian organization, for that purpose 
while leaving the construction of a free society for “after the revolution”, the battle 
has already been lost’ (Gordon 2008: 37). The type of ‘slow’ social change that 
anarchists are advocating is what Gordon calls ‘anarchist r/evolution’ (Gordon 2008: 
128). It is living social transformation every day through repeating practices that 
create more habitable spheres not only for oneself but for others, and particularly for 
those in the position of vulnerability. As Gordon says ‘a central motivation for 
anarchist action […] lies in the desire to inhabit, to the greatest extent possible, social 
relations that approximate anarchists’ ideals for society as a whole’ (Gordon 2009: 
271).  
 Such practices, aimed at changing a given status quo on a day-to-day basis, are 
undertaken by affinity groups in anarchist collectivities. An affinity group can be 
either more permanent (in establishing a housing project, a publishing house, a co-op 
farm) or less permanent in a short-term coming together for the purpose of one 
activity: guerrilla planting of trees in an urban space, alternative spectacles, festivals, 
parody (see Day 2005, Newman 2009). Activity in such collectivities is important 
because they create spaces that function according to rules that are different from the 
society around them. They are slowly taking over space through establishing 
alternatively functioning structures and inspiring others to undertake similar practices. 																																																								
7 For other anarchist thinkers who also explicitly engage in elaborating a non-
revolutionary form of anarchism see, in particular, Graeber 2004, 2007; Day 2005 and 
Davis 2012 for a good overview and discussion of non-revolutionary anarchism. 
Davis comments on what Graeber and Gordon propose: ‘it reflects a very significant 
and growing trend in the contemporary anarchist movement and beyond which is 
creatively redefining revolutionary struggle for the twenty-first century’ (Davis 2012: 
224). According to Davis, the greatest contribution to the creative re-imagination of 
the revolutionary tradition is ‘the recognition that revolution can no longer plausibly 
be conceived as a singular, totalizing break with past structures of oppression, but 
must instead be regarded as an ongoing and indeed never-ending historical process’ 
(Davis 2012: 228). The question is, however, if one should still use the term 
revolution for that form of change? I argue in my forthcoming book on universality 
and ‘slow’ social transformation that revolution is an inappropriate term for this form 
of social transformation (see Janicka). 
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Sloterdijk’s theory of spheres allows us to describe this type of ‘slow’ social change 
and the practices of affinity groups in anarchist collectivities. By thinking in terms of 
Sloterdijk’s foams one is able to understand and philosophically support anarchist 
collectives. Let us then first see how Sloterdijk describes foams and the interactions 
between microspheres and then connect this to anarchism as described by Gordon. 
Sloterdijk defines foam as a collection of bubbles in the microspherological sense: 
 
With the concept of foam we describe an agglomeration of bubbles in the 
microspherological sense […]. The term stands for systems or aggregates of 
spherological neighbourhoods in which each ‘cell’ builds a self-completing 
context (colloquially: a world, a place), an intimate space of meaning or a 
‘household’ that is maintained by dyadic and pluripolar resonances and that is 
animated by its very own dynamic. (S III 55)  
 
Foam is a system without a centre or hierarchy (S III 50). It a relationship-hothouse 
(Beziehungen-Treibhaus), in which every dyadic subjectivity builds a sphere of 
intimacy, and each bubble is preoccupied with its own immunity, with its own micro-
insulation (see S III 498). The composites of foam are bubbles of different sizes and 
ages that are glued to one another. Foam works according to the principle of co-
isolation (Ko-Isolation) where one and the same wall functions as a border for other 
microspheres. In this way, bubbles in foam influence one another (see S III 55). If one 
bubble bursts, the others are affected by it and the fragility and co-fragility of bubbles 
is important for immunitary configurations of human existence. Therefore, sharing 
walls both provides stability and exposes bubbles to danger. What Sloterdijk’s theory 
of spheres accomplishes is conceptualizing social life as precarious, as one ‘consisting 
of the precarious building and break-down of spatial collectivities’ (Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf-Eelens 2011: 13). We are constantly building and destroying 
microspheres in our daily life or they are built and destroyed for us.  
From a spherological perspective ‘society’8 is 
 
[a]n aggregate of microspheres (couples, households, companies, federations) 
of different formats that like individual bubbles border with each other in a 
mountain of foam and order themselves under and above each other without 
ever really being either within reach or effectively separable from one another. 
(S III 59) 
 
In foam the basic elements are not individuals but pairs, households and resonance 
communities (Resonanzgemeinschaften) (see S III 302). As Borch remarks, defining 
couples, households, companies, and federations as single bubbles that make up foam 
runs the risk of reducing their complexity (see 2011: 32). However, this seems to be 
merely a question of scale and foams should be viewed as structures with a fractal 
dimension: from a distant perspective couples, households, companies and federations 
may be viewed as single bubbles embedded in a ‘society’ foam, yet from a close 
perspective they are complex foams in their own right composed of multiple bubbles. 
Each microsphere has a monadic fractal structure where a part is a minimal version of 
the whole. As mentioned above, microspheres emerge each time a membrane is 
formed that produces immunity. This happens each time one interacts with people and 																																																								
8 The word ‘society’ is always put in inverted commas in Spheres as Sloterdijk tries to 
propose an alternative term for it i.e. foam.  
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objects, when ‘one goes from one thing to the next and builds a context, a coherence 
or a connection (Zusammenhang)’ (Morin 2012: 87). Consequently, rather than 
dispersing, foams operate by concentrating and agglomerating – they form 
collectivities. According to Sloterdijk, the proper dwelling of a human being is a 
sphere or multiple spheres where solidarity, trust, and cooperation can develop. Each 
person spontaneously produces meaningful surroundings that establish connections 
(see S III 662), that is, instances that multiply spheres and so create foams. Even such 
non-spatial relations like sympathy or understanding translate themselves into spatial 
terms in order to be imaginable and liveable (see S III 13–14). From this metaphorical 
conceptualization (Denkbild) of foam one can propose interpretations of social 
connections: 
 
Also in the human field, the single cells are glued to one another by reciprocal 
isolations, separations and immunisations. The multiple co-isolation of 
bubble-households [Vielfach-Ko-Isolation der Blasen-Haushalte] in their 
plural neighbourhoods can be described as simultaneously closed off and 
cosmopolitan. This is where the specificity of this type of objects lies. That is 
why when seen from one’s own perspective, foam builds a paradoxical 
interior where most of the surrounding co-bubbles are at the same time close 
by and inaccessible, connected and distracted. In spherology, foams build 
‘societies’ in this limited sense of the word. (S III 56–7) 
 
Although bubbles are inaccessible to one another, they share walls that allow an 
exchange with the surrounding. Sloterdijk calls them ‘porous foams’ (poröse 
Schäume). The relations between microspheres are based on imitation and contagion: 
‘the similarity between neighbours is based on mimetic contagion [mimetische 
Ansteckung]’ (see S III 259–60). In an interview with Bettina Funcke, Sloterdijk 
claims: ‘in social foam there is no “communication” [...] but instead only inter-autistic 
and mimetic relations’ (Sloterdijk and Funcke 2005).  
In You Must Change your Life Sloterdijk develops a thesis that humans are 
‘beings [that] result from repetition’ (MLA 4). As a mimetic being this Homo 
repetitivus ‘struggles with itself in concern for its form’ by means of infinite 
repetition (MLA 10). Bubbles and foams are important as co-isolated spaces because 
they allow habits, which are cases of sedimented mimesis, to develop in a controlled 
environment. They influence mimesis because they provide good or bad models that 
will be wittingly or unwittingly imitated. This human being creates not only her 
psychosocial immune system through training and habit but also herself as a subject: 
 
Just as practice makes perfect, training makes the subject. […] As soon as one 
realizes how every gesture carried out shapes its performer and determines 
their future state from the second occurrence on, one also knows why there is 
no such thing as a meaningless movement. (MLA 322)  
 
And also: 
 
Humans live in habits, not territories. Radical changes of location first of all 
attack the human rooting in habits, and only then the places in which those 
habits are rooted. Since the few have been explicitly practising, it has become 
evident that all people practice implicitly, and beyond this that humans are 
beings that cannot not practice – if practising means repeating a pattern of 
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action in such a way that its execution improves the being’s disposition 
towards the next repetition. (MLA 407) 
 
 
For Sloterdijk, ethics emerges automatically with mimesis because we are ‘damned to 
distinguish between repetitions’, between models to be imitated (MLA 404). That is 
why, Sloterdijk considers mimetic human being to be equivalent to ethical human 
being. He says: ‘we will characterize [Homo immunologicus] more closely as the 
ethical human being or rather Homo repetitivus, Homo artista, the human in training’ 
(MLA 10). For Sloterdijk, ethics is a ‘primary orientation’. He says: 
 
This brings into view an ethics that does not have values, norms and 
imperatives at its centre, but rather elementary orientations in the ‘field’ of 
existence. In the orientation-ethical approach to the how, the whither and the 
wherefore of existence, it is assumed that the ‘subjects’ – the existing parties 
as those able and unable to live their lives – are ‘always already’ immersed in 
a field or milieu that provides them with basic neighbourhoods, moods, and 
tensions in certain directions. (MLA 161) 
 
These orientations constitute tendencies: moods, and inclinations rather than points, 
acts, and givens. For Sloterdijk, ‘we have to practise learning to live – and […] one 
can neither not practise nor not learn to live’ (MLA 59). From this perspective, 
Sloterdijk reads the classical theory of habitus or hexis, such as that of Aristotle or 
Thomas Aquinas, as a theory of training where virtue is described as second nature 
acquired through practice (see MLA 184), in the sense that a good person is an ‘artist 
of virtus’. She is constantly training her artistry of good. As Sloterdijk puts it: ‘The 
authentic form of the habitus theory describes humans in all discretion as acrobats of 
virtus – one could also say as carriers of moral competency that turns into social and 
artistic power’ (MLA 185).9 The older theories of habitus that Sloterdijk considers as 
correct conceptualizations of repetition constitute ‘part of a doctrine of incorporation 
and in-formation of virtues’ (MLA 184). There, ‘the original ethical life’ is 
tantamount to oriented mimesis that ‘always seeks to exchange harmful for favourable 
repetition. It wants to replace corrupt life forms with upright ones’ (MLA 405). From 
this perspective it is possible, therefore, to claim that a concern for good habits is a 
form of practising social transformation. Social transformation is directly related to 
the daily practice of good habits. The ‘good’ is defined as a practice that makes the 
world a more habitable rather than a less habitable place.  
 In contemporary anarchism, affinity groups operate with the same basic 
assumption – they direct their practices towards creating a more habitable world, in 
particular bearing in mind the entities that are in the position of unintelligibility and 
vulnerability. By doing this they also attempt to mimetically infect (or, in other 
words, inspire) others to follow suit. Viewed from this perspective, anarchist 
collectivities can be considered as foams. Both of them are spaces that are constructed 
through mimetic practice. As foams aggregate, ‘neighbouring’ microspheres acquire 
similar habits through ‘imitative infections’ (immitativen Infektionen) (see S III 259–
60). This is how contagion in human foam (Humanschaum) is possible, and how it 
																																																								
9 Sloterdijk considers Bourdieu’s theory of habitus limited in its scope on many 
different levels. For a critical discussion see MLA 175–89. 
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can spread to other collectivities. It is this mimetic practice that makes spheres as a 
result more habitable or less habitable. As Eduardo Mendieta rightly put it: 
 
Anthropotechnology, qua study of the different practices that lead to the 
creation of different habitats with corresponding habits, the setting up of 
different residencies in which to lodge and accommodate so that we can 
inhabit under and with others, means that ‘humanity’ has once again become a 
thoroughly political category. (Mendieta 2012: 76) 
 
Thus, mimesis, as an ethical and political mechanism, comes down to a concern for 
good models and good habits that, in consequence, produce liveable habitats for all. 
Spherology, similarly to anarchism, proposes an idea of transformation that is based 
on daily effort and constant training that will make a limited space – stretching from 
an apartment to a shared planet – more (rather than less) fit to live in. This form of 
transformation is based on cooperation, solidarity and community and is an 
alternative to an abrupt and heroic idea of social change such as a revolution. The 
effects of habits both on humans and the natural environment are a matter of equally 
serious concern and this makes the idea of day-to-day, mimetic transformation non-
anthropocentric and so particularly valuable to eco-anarchists.  
 From anarchist perspective, building a community or a collectivity that works 
differently from the oppressive structures around it is already an act of localized 
social transformation. It means creating an alternative structure, an alternative 
microclimatic space that is good to live in for the dominated person in question by 
providing her with co-immunity. Such an alternative is also created in the hope of 
affecting and inspiring people who encounter it. Or, if we use the language of 
Sloterdijk, we can say that alternative spaces in contemporary anarchism (housing 
projects, squats, co-operative farms, autonomous zones) are bubbles and foam that 
provide co-immunity structures. These give support to the oppressed and also create 
models that will, it is hoped, infect adjacent spaces and so will spread the contagion of 
change. That is also why Sloterdijk’s theory of space (Raumtheorie) is so interesting 
for thinking anarchism on an abstract level. It is able to account for the efforts that are 
directed at space: taking over spaces and transforming them into livable atmospheres. 
It also allows the promotion of a different concept of agency that is based on mimesis 
and training.  
The introduction of radical heterogenic spaces such as anarchist collectivities 
has disruptive qualities in that it shows there is an alternative to the status quo and has 
an infectious effect on adjacent spaces, on adjacent bubbles in the foam that is 
‘society’. Such anarchist collectivities present much needed mimetic models that 
would present itself for imitation and that also compete with other (‘more standard’) 
mimetic models available in culture. They are also important because they are starting 
points of transformative contagion for the future: ‘the collectives, communes and 
networks of today are themselves the groundwork for the realities that will replace the 
present society. Collectively-run grassroots projects are, on this account, the seeds of 
a future society “within the shell of the old”’ (Gordon 2008: 37). Contemporary 
anarchism as a form of ‘slow’ social transformation is a continuous activity located in 
the present rather than a dream of the future, it is a matter of the arts of existence 
rather than rare events that revolutionize the world; it is a question of living rather 
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than of demanding.10 In its practices, anarchism actualizes the assumption that 
humans are mimetic beings who build and share spheres with other entities in the 
world. Because one is already an active, mimetic being that establishes habits through 
repetition, social transformation is a question of directing one’s mimesis. It means 
directing it towards habits that improve the spheres we inhabit not only for ourselves 
but also for other humans, animals, plants, the environment surrounding us. It means 
directing mimesis towards solidarity with the unintelligible because the unintelligible 
is what is constitutive of our existence. Anarchism realizes this intuition about human 
beings and their relation to the surrounding world. That is why contemporary 
anarchism in practice can be defined as an effective form of harnessing mimesis 
towards a more habitable world.  
A new idiom for thinking about anarchism and anarchist solidarities is 
important because it allows us to account for the complexity of anarchist collectives. 
The main purpose of introducing spherology in this contest is not to enter the 
squabble about who counts as anarchist and who does not but rather to propose a 
different metaphorical conceptualization (Denkbild) for thinking about anarchist 
practice, a different way to think about humans and their sociality. Contemporary 
anarchism in practice is a multifaceted phenomenon that the received theoretical 
patterns for analysing social movements do not fully capture. Terms such as equality, 
domination or revolution miss the importance of: (i) habits in anarchist set-ups and 
(ii) solidarity with both the excluded particularities and the unintelligible. In order to 
capture this specificity of contemporary anarchism in practice and its focus on co-
operative habits, adopting a new language and a new philosophical lens is crucial. 
That is why spherological perspective can be of interest to anarchist studies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Sloterdijk offers a different way to think about anarchism and anarchist collectivities. 
With his theory of spheres it is possible to envision radical transformation as 
happening continuously throughout society. Humans through orienting their mimesis 
produce spheres that become more habitable or less habitable, depending on their 
habits. In this paper I argued that such social transformation, if oriented towards 
producing more habitable spheres, finds its fullest realization in contemporary 
anarchism in practice. Uri Gordon’s Anarchy Alive! describes anarchism in a way that 
makes it possible to consider spherology as a potential philosophical framework for 
understanding contemporary anarchism in practice. Contemporary anarchism is 
tantamount to collectively creating habitable spheres on a daily basis in the hope that 
other people or groups will be mimetically infected by the change that is implemented 
in anarchist collectivities. It permits thinking about social transformation beyond an 
exclusive concern for the human. It is a way to think about the collective production 
of habitable spheres not only for humans but also for the natural world. 
 In this paper I also attempted to demonstrate that contemporary anarchism in 
practice can be described through the concept of solidarity with the intelligible. With 																																																								
10 Saul Newman calls it ‘enacted utopia that emerges in the present, from present 
conditions, and that, at the same time, affirms a radical break with the present and the 
invention of something completely new’ (Newman 2009: 211). Gordon, like 
Newman, also attaches his idea of anarchism to a certain reformulation of utopianism, 
(see Gordon 2009; see also on the connection between anarchism and utopianism: 
Kinna and Davis 2009). 
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Sloterdijk I proposed to define solidarity as a form of a strong relationship to the 
unintelligible. Sloterdijk’s idea of co-immunity as ontological solidarity and his 
challenge to our usual thinking about space are two contributions that have the 
potential to be extremely valuable for anarchism. They reposition human beings 
towards each other and towards the outer world. As the effective co-immunity 
structures today are thought on too small a scale: they are formatted ‘as in ancient 
times, […] tribally, nationally and imperially’ (MLA 450), an expansion of the 
concept of immunity seems necessary. We need to reconsider our usual allegiances. 
We need to start understanding that ‘individual immunity is only possible as co-
immunity’ (MLA 450) not only with other humans but with the world around us. It 
means making a decision ‘to take on the good habits of shared survival in daily 
exercises’ (MLA 451–2). This decision regards the direction of mimesis, performed 
by our bodies, as part of a continuous social transformation. ‘Slow’ social 
transformation is then a matter of habit and, through the repetition of practice, it 
amounts to creating spaces, a ‘microclimate of practising life’ (MLA 229) that have 
the potential to spread in favourable socio-political conditions. This is possible 
because spaces and ambiences produced by mimetic humans are never separated from 
other spaces and other people. The shared space that surrounds us, filled with the air 
we all breathe and the ambiences we produce, is what we have in common. Once we 
start thinking in those terms it is impossible to go back to theories based on an 
individual as a point of departure. This is a way to think about ‘the common’ beyond 
communism.11 And this is, in fact, what contemporary anarchist movements actualize 
in practice.  
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